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OPINION   
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Kwame Dwumaah pled guilty to theft of public monies under 18 U.S.C. § 641.  
He was subsequently found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) for falsely 
claiming U.S. citizenship.  Dwumaah now seeks a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his 
conviction on the ground that he was misadvised of the immigration consequences of his 
plea.  The District Court ultimately denied the writ.  Dwumaah appeals.
1
  We affirm. 
I.  Background 
 Dwumaah, a native of Ghana, initially entered the United States on a non-
immigrant visa in 1989 and remained in the country after the visa expired.  He later 
married a U.S. citizen and subsequently became a conditional permanent resident in 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Dwumaah is represented on appeal by pro 
bono counsel from the Dechert firm. We express our appreciation for undertaking that 
representation and its professionalism in doing so. 
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1999.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) determined Dwumaah’s marriage 
to be fraudulent in June 2004 and later that year began removal proceedings under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D) (“Termination of conditional permanent residence”).  
 In April 2005, Dwumaah was indicted for twenty-eight counts of fraud under 
various statutes.  The primary allegation of the indictment was that he had improperly 
acquired over $75,000 in federal student aid by using a false name and Social Security 
number and misrepresenting his immigration status.   
 Under a plea agreement, Dwumaah pled guilty to a single count of theft of public 
monies in August 2005.  At the time, he was represented by John Abom in the criminal 
proceeding and Wayne Sachs in the immigration proceeding.  As later found by the 
District Court, Abom and Sachs worked together to arrange a plea bargain that would 
avoid aggravated felon status under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which would render 
Dwumaah automatically removable.  In recommending the plea, Abom told Dwumaah he 
might still face removal if the crime were classified as a crime of moral turpitude under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  At the time, Abom was apparently not aware of  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(3)(D)(i), under which a person can be subject to removal for falsely claiming 
U.S. citizenship.  Dwumaah was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and one year 
supervised release and ordered to pay $75,192 in restitution.   
 DHS subsequently  amended the Notice to Appear in the removal proceedings to 
include § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i).  An Immigration Judge eventually determined Dwumaah’s 
marriage was not fraudulent but found him removable based on a false claim of U.S. 
citizenship (for which no formal conviction is necessary).  Dwumaah subsequently 
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pursued unsuccessful collateral attacks on his conviction before filing a pro se petition 
for a writ of error coram nobis in September 2011.  In this petition, he argued that he 
would not have pled guilty had he been properly informed of the removal consequences 
of his plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  In February 2013, 
the District Court granted the writ and vacated Dwumaah’s conviction in reliance on 
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011), which held that Padilla applied 
retroactively.   
 Nineteen days later, the Supreme Court held in Chaidez v. United  States, 133 
S. Ct. 1103 (2013), that Padilla did not apply retroactively, thus abrogating Orocio.  The 
Government moved to reconsider the grant of the writ based on Chaidez.  Dwumaah, 
through counsel, opposed the motion.  The District Court granted the motion and, on 
reconsideration, denied the writ of error coram nobis.  Dwumaah now appeals that denial. 
II. Analysis 
 In appeals from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis, “[w]e review the District 
Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Mendoza v. 
United States, 690 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).  A district court has the power, under 
appropriate circumstances, to grant a writ of error coram nobis and vacate a conviction,  
see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511(1954), but the writ “is an extraordinary 
remedy, and a court’s jurisdiction to grant relief is of limited scope.” United States v. 
Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).  Indeed, “it is difficult to conceive of a 
situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of error coram nobis ] would be 
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necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)). 
 From the governing cases, one can discern five requirements a movant must meet 
to receive coram nobis relief from a federal conviction.  First, he or she must no longer 
be in custody and therefore not be eligible for alternative remedies such as habeas 
corpus.  Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.1.  Second, he or she must nonetheless suffer 
continuing consequences of his or her conviction.  United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 
1059 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-13).  Third, “coram nobis relief is 
limited to correct[ing] errors ‘of the most fundamental character.’” Id. (quoting Morgan, 
346 U.S. at 512).  Fourth, there must have been no remedy for the defect available at trial.  
Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512).  Finally, the petitioner must 
show that “‘sound reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief earlier.” Id.   
 The parties effectively agree that the first two elements are satisfied.  Dwumaah is 
no longer in custody and thus is ineligible for habeas relief.  See United States v. 
Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court concluded that the 
possibility of removal was a sufficient continuing consequence of conviction, and the 
Government has not challenged that conclusion.   
 The dispute here centers on whether Dwumaah has shown a fundamental error in 
his trial, in particular ineffective assistance of counsel.  It is well established in our 
caselaw that ineffective assistance of counsel is a fundamental error for purposes of a writ 
of error coram nobis.  See, e.g., United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 
F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[P]ersons not held in custody can attack a conviction for 
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fundamental defects, such as ineffective assistance of counsel.  The mechanism is a 
motion in the form of the common-law writ of error coram nobis.” (citing cases)). 
 Dwumaah argues that the District Court erred because it failed to recognize the 
distinction between failure to advise and affirmative misadvice as to immigration 
consequences.  While Chaidez precludes an ineffectiveness claim based on the former, 
Dwumaah contends that affirmative misadvice was recognized as ineffective assistance 
prior to Padilla and that he deserves relief on this basis.  He essentially argues that it was 
affirmative misadvice for Abom to inform him that, under the plea, removal was a mere 
possibility under the moral turpitude provision when in fact removal was essentially 
certain under the false claim of citizenship provision. 
 We do not get to the merits of his claim because Dwumaah waived this argument.  
In United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013), we held “that for parties to 
preserve an argument for appeal, they must have raised the same argument in the District 
Court—merely raising an issue that encompasses the appellate argument is not enough.” 
Id. at 337 (emphases in original).  In reaching this conclusion, we clarified our use of 
terminology: “an issue can be broader in scope than an argument in that an issue may be 
addressed by multiple arguments, which are the most basic building blocks of legal 
reasoning.” Id.  “[T]he crucial question regarding waiver is whether [the appellant] 
presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court.” Brennan v. 
Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 
F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir.1993)).   
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 Although Dwumaah has repeatedly raised the issue of ineffective assistance, he 
raises for the first time on appeal the argument of ineffective assistance on the basis of 
affirmative misadvice.  His pro se petition contains a single-sentence assertion that he 
was affirmatively misadvised, without any supporting legal argumentation, based on a 
factual allegation the District Court specifically rejected.  This is insufficient to alert the 
District Court.  See  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to preserve it 
for appeal . . . .”).  Dwumaah’s subsequent counseled filings before the District Court do 
not argue that he was affirmatively misadvised.
2
  There are no references in his filings 
prior to this appeal to a non-Padilla based protection against affirmative misadvice, even 
in his (counseled) opposition to the Government’s post-Chaidez motion for 
reconsideration.  The District Court therefore never had the opportunity to consider the 
affirmative misadvice theory of ineffective assistance of counsel because Dwumaah 
never presented it to that Court.  As such, this argument is waived.
3
 
 On appeal, Dwumaah has presented no other arguments for ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  As a result, he has not shown a fundamental error at trial, a prerequisite to a 
                                              
2
 After it granted an evidentiary hearing on the basis of Dwumaah’s pro se petition, the 
District Court appointed a solo practitioner to represent Dwumaah in the coram nobis 
proceedings. This attorney remained as counsel until he made an unopposed motion to 
withdraw two days after the District Court order granting reconsideration and denying the 
writ. 
3
 Dwumaah argues in the alternative that we ought to exercise our discretion to reach the 
waived argument.  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005).  We decline 
to do so.  
8 
 
writ of error coram nobis, and thus cannot establish a right to relief.  It is therefore 
unnecessary for us to address the remaining requirements for the writ. Thus we affirm.   
 
